We consider a polling system with two queues, exhaustive service, no switch-over times and exponential service times with rate µ in each queue. The waiting cost depends on the position of the queue relative to the server: It costs a customer c per time unit to wait in the busy queue (where the server is) and d per time unit in the idle queue (where no server is). Customers arrive according to a Poisson process with rate λ. We study the control problem of how arrivals should be routed to the two queues in order to minimize expected waiting costs and characterize individually and socially optimal routing policies under three scenarios of available information at decision epochs: no, partial and complete information. In the complete information case, we develop a new iterative algorithm to determine individually optimal policies, and show that such policies can be described by a switching curve. We conjecture that a linear switching curve is socially optimal, and prove that this policy is indeed optimal for the fluid version of the two-queue polling system.
Introduction
Polling systems have applications in diverse fields such as manufacturing, telecommunications, time-sharing computer systems, wireless networks, to name a few. There is a very We assume that the waiting cost in a queue depends on its downstream position from the server. This is motivated by the tradeoff one normally encounters: we might be able to reduce the waiting cost by joining a queue farther from the server, but it will increase the total waiting time. One motivation for such a case arises from appointment systems, although the analogy is not quite accurate: one can be a walk-in customer and join the queue where the server is now (today's queue at the clinic), or one can get an appointment for a later day and join a shorter queue, because waiting at home is cheaper than waiting at the clinic.
Finally, we consider the control problem from two different points of view: the customer (or individually optimal) and the system manager (socially optimal) point of view . Socially versus individually optimal policies have been well studied in the queueing literature, see Lippman and Stidham [14] and Hassin and Haviv [10] . Computation of individually optimal policies becomes complicated when the decisions of later customers can influence a customer's waiting cost. For example, Altman and Shimkon [1] study individually optimal policies in processor sharing queues, where the decisions by later customers influence one's waiting costs, because they affect the effective service rate available to any customer. They also introduce an iterative algorithm to find Nash equilibria. In our case, the analysis of individually optimal policies is similarly complicated by the fact that a customer's total cost is affected by the behavior of the customers arriving after her. We provide a new iterative algorithm to derive Nash equilibria in such a case.
To keep the analysis simple, we consider an exponential system with only two queues and no switch-over times. Even for such a simple system, the analysis provides interesting insights, and can be quite involved. We introduce the model and notation in Section 2. The case of no information is studied in Section 3, and partial information in Section 4. In both cases, we study Nash equilibria in the individually optimal analysis, and minimize the long-run average cost rate in the socially optimal case. The case of complete information is studied in Section 5. We present a new iterative algorithm to determine individually optimal policies, and show that such policies can be described by a switching curve. The socially optimal policies can be derived by using negative dynamic programming. We present a novel proof of existence of average cost optimal policies, but we have not been able to derive structural results in that case. However, numerical experimentation suggests a simple approximate socially optimal routing policy, which can described by a linear switching curve. In Section 6 we formulate the problem as a control problem of a fluid polling queueing system, and prove that the approximate policy conjectured in Section 5 is in fact optimal in the fluid model. We end the paper with a numerical example and a brief summary in Section 7.
Polling Model
We consider a polling system with two queues; see Figure 1 . Customers arrive at this system according to a Poisson process with rate λ. The service times are independent and exponentially distributed with rate µ at each queue. A single server serves the two nodes in a cyclic fashion with exhaustive service. The switch-over times are assumed to be zero.
PP(λ)
Exp(µ) Figure 1 : The two-queue exponential polling model with exhaustive service.
For stability we assume ρ = λ/µ < 1. The only costs in the system are waiting costs: It costs a customer c dollars to wait in a queue that is being served (called the busy queue), while it costs her d per unit time to wait in a queue that is not being served (called the idle queue). We aim to study how the arrivals should be routed to the two queues in order to minimize expected waiting costs. In the following sections we characterize individually optimal and socially optimal routing policies under various levels of information knowledge: No information, partial information and complete information.
No Information
Suppose that arriving customers have no information about the state of the system, i.e., they do not know where the server is and what the queue lengths are. In this case, the most general policy is described by a single parameter p ∈ [0, 1] as follows: each customer joins queue 1 with probability p 1 = p and queue 2 with probability p 2 = 1 − p 1 . We use the notation ρ i = ρp i (i = 1, 2). Define L ij as the expected number of customers in queue i given that the server is serving queue j. The next theorem gives these quantities; see e.g. Winands et al. [23] , Winands [22] and Boon [4] . Theorem 3.1. Under the above routing policy we have, for all 0 ≤ p ≤ 1,
Using the above theorem we derive the socially optimal policies in the next theorem. (join either queue with probability 1 2 ).
ii. If c = d, all policies p ∈ [0, 1] are socially optimal.
iii. If c < d, there are two socially optimal policies: p = 0 and p = 1 (everyone joins queue 1 or everyone joins queue 2).
Proof. The socially optimal policy minimizes the expected cost of a customer in steady state, which is given by
where C 1 and C 2 are the expected cost of joining queue 1 and 2, respectively,
It then follows that dC dp
Now if c > d, the above expression implies that C decreases as p 1 increases from 0 to . If c < d, C increases as p 1 increases from 0 to 1 2 , and decreases as p 1 increases from 1 2 to 1. Thus C is minimized at p 1 = 0 and p 1 = 1. From symmetry, both these minima are identical. When c = d, C does not depend on p 1 . Hence the result follows.
The next theorem states the results about the individually optimal (Nash equilibrium) policies. . This policy is socially optimal.
ii. If c(1 − ρ) = d, every policy p ∈ [0, 1] is a Nash equilibrium policy, but only p = 1 2 is socially optimal.
iii. If c(1 − ρ) < d, there are three Nash equilibrium policies: p = 0, p = is socially optimal if c > d, each of them is socially optimal if c = d, and p = 0 and p = 1 are socially optimal if c < d.
Proof. Suppose arriving customers join queue 1 with probability p 1 = p and queue 2 with probability p 2 = 1 − p 1 . Now suppose a smart customer knows how the other customers are behaving, and decides to use this system to minimize her own waiting costs. If she joins queue 1, her expected cost is C 1 and otherwise, if she joins queue 2, her expected cost is C 2 . It then follows that
Consider the case c(1
, then C 1 > C 2 and the smart customer will join queue 2, that is, use p 1 = 0; and if all customers use p 1 < 1 2 , she will use p 1 = 1. Thus in these cases there is no Nash equilibrium. If all the customers follow the policy p 1 = 1 2 , the smart customer is indifferent between the two options and can choose
is a Nash equilibrium. If c(1 − ρ) = d, the smart customer is also indifferent, so all policies are a Nash equilibrium. Next, in case c(1 − ρ) < d, it is readily verified that there are three Nash equilibrium policies, p 1 = 0, p 1 = 
Partial Information
In this section we consider the case of partial information. Specifically, we assume that all customers know which queue is being served by the server, but the individual queue lengths at the two queues are not known. We call the queue that the server is at the busy queue and the other queue the idle queue. We assume that if both queues become empty after a service completion, the server stays at the queue it served last. Thus the busy queue and idle queue are well defined at all times. Now the most general policy that a customer can follow is described by a single parameter p ∈ [0, 1] as follows: join the busy queue with probability p 1 = p and join the idle queue with probability p 2 = 1 − p 1 . Hence, under this policy, the Poisson arrival rates in the two queues depend on the server location. This system with "smart customers" has been analyzed by Boon et al. [3] . Let L B be the expected number of customers in the busy queue, and L I be the expected number of customers in the idle queue, in steady state, under this policy. The next theorem gives these two quantities, see e.g. Boon et al. [3] . Theorem 4.1. Under the above policy we have, for all 0 ≤ p ≤ 1,
Using the above theorem we derive the socially optimal policies in the next theorem. iii. If c < d, the socially optimal policy is for everyone to join the busy queue.
Proof. The socially optimal policy minimizes the expected cost of a customer in steady state. The expected cost of an arriving customer in steady state is given by
where C B and C I are the expected cost of joining the busy and idle queue, respectively,
This can be simplified to get
.
Thus if c > d, C is an increasing function of ρ 1 , hence it is minimized at ρ 1 = 0. That is, the socially optimal policy is for everyone to join the idle queue. On the other hand, if c < d, C is a decreasing function of ρ 1 , hence it is minimized at ρ 1 = 1. Then the socially optimal policy is for everyone to join the busy queue. If c = d, then the cost does not depend on ρ 1 , and all policies are optimal.
The next theorem states the results about the individually optimal (Nash equilibrium) policies. ii. If c(1 − ρ) ≤ d < c : the Nash equilibrium policy is to join the busy queue. It is not the socially optimal policy.
iii. If c ≤ d : the Nash equilibrium policy is to join the busy queue. It is also a socially optimal policy.
Proof. Suppose arriving customers join the busy queue with probability p 1 and the idle queue with probability p 2 = 1 − p 1 . Now suppose a smart customer knows how the other customers are behaving, and decides to use this system to minimize her own waiting costs. If she joins the busy queue, her expected cost is C B and otherwise, if she joins idle queue, her expected cost is C I . Using the formulas for L B and L I from Theorem 4.1 we get
Note that the sign of C B − C I does not depend on p 1 , the policy followed by all the other customers. Now consider three cases.
i. c(1 − ρ) > d: Equation (5) implies that C B > C I , and hence the smart customer will also join the idle queue, regardless of what the other customers are doing. Thus joining the idle queue is a Nash equilibrium. In this case we also have c > d. Hence from Theorem 4.2, the socially optimal policy is to join the idle queue. Thus Nash equilibrium is also the socially optimal policy.
ii.
In this case, C B < C I , and hence the smart customer will join the busy queue, regardless of what the other customers are doing. Hence joining the busy queue is a Nash equilibrium policy. However, the socially optimal policy is for everyone to join the idle queue. Thus the Nash equilibrium is to join the busy queue, but the socially optimal policy is to join the idle queue! Individual optimization in this case actually maximizes the social cost.
iii. c ≤ d: The analysis is similar.
Remark 4.4. We can write the condition c(1
The left hand side is the expected cost of waiting in the busy queue for one service time, while the right hand side is the expected cost of waiting in the idle queue for a busy period initiated by a single customer. It makes sense that the smart customers weighs these two costs in order to make her decision, while the social optimizer compares c and d. This results in the Nash equilibrium policies sending more customers to the busy queue than the socially optimal policies.
Complete Information
Now suppose every customer has complete knowledge of the state of the system, namely, the server location and the length of each queue. How would the customers use this information to decide which queue to join?
Single Smart Customer
Suppose that the static routing policy p is under effect (which does not have to be optimal) and that a special customer wants to use this information to minimize her own expected total waiting cost. She can observe the number of customers in the two queues when she arrives at the system: i in the busy queue, and j in the idle queue. Which queue should she join?
If she joins the busy queue, her total expected cost is ci/µ. If she joins the idle queue, the total expected waiting cost is di/(µ − λp) + cj/µ. Here the first term represents the i busy periods that she must wait before the server starts serving the idle queue (and making it the busy queue). Thus it is optimal for her to join the queue under service if
and join the idle queue if ci µ
Clearly, she could choose either queue if equality holds. If d = 0, her decision rule reduces to join the shortest queue. Else, the decision rule is a linear switching curve.
Smart Customer Population
Now suppose all customers are smart, and each makes a decision to minimize her own total expected waiting cost, assuming that other customers will do the same. If d = 0, each customer will decide to join the shortest queue, and since this decision is independent of how the other customers behave, this produces a Nash equilibrium. The case d ≥ c is also obvious: each customer will decide to join the busy queue, which is a Nash equilibrium. However, the case 0 < d < c is not so obvious. In this case, the single smart customer's decision was made under the assumption that all other customers join the busy queue with probability p and the idle queue with probability 1 − p. However, if every customer chooses the policy derived by the single smart customer, then the single customer's analysis is no longer valid.
So suppose we are given a decision function f :
implies that an arriving customer that finds i customers in the busy queue and j customers in the idle queue joins the busy (idle) queue. Let τ f (i, j) be the expected time until the busy queue empties if the system starts with i customers in the busy queue, and j in the idle queue, under decision function f . Note that τ f (i, j) is bounded by i/(µ − λ), which is the expected time to empty the busy queue if all future arrivals are sent to the busy queue. It is individually optimal to join the busy queue if
and to join the idle queue if
We say that f * is an individually optimal decision function if
The function f * also describes a Nash equilibrium policy. We now present a recursive method to compute f * . We consider a finite horizon system that operates as follows. Let n ≥ 0 be a given integer (the "horizon"). Let (i, j) be the initial state of the system (i ≥ 1, j ≥ 0). We assume that after n events (arrivals or departures), arrivals are turned off and only departures are allowed to occur, and the systems stops operation once it becomes empty. Let δ n (i, j) represent the new state of the system if a customer arrives when the horizon is n, and the system is in state (i, j) and chooses an action that minimizes her own cost. Let τ n (i, j) be the expected time until the busy queue becomes empty if the system with horizon n starts in state (i, j), and all the arrivals behave in an individually optimal way. We have
This reflects that a zero horizon system has no more arrivals and hence the server completes the work in the current queue after an expected time of i/µ. Now recursively define for all
where τ n (0, j) = 0. The next lemma formulates monotonicity properties of τ n (i, j).
Proof. By induction. For n = 0 we have
Hence, (7)- (10) hold for n = 0. Now assume (7)- (10) hold for n. Then we will show that these inequalities also hold for n + 1. To establish (7) for n + 1, consider
The first term is nonnegative by (7). If δ n (i, j + 1) = (i + 1, j + 1), then for both δ n (i, j) = (i + 1, j) and δ n (i, j) = (i, j + 1), we can conclude that the second term is nonnegative by application of (8) and (7). If δ n (i, j + 1) = (i, j + 2), then δ n (i, j) = (i, j + 1) by (7), and thus we can again conclude that the second term is nonnegative by (7) . For (8) we get
The first term on the right-hand side is nonnegative by (8) . If δ n (i + 1, j) = (i + 2, j), then for both δ n (i, j + 1) = (i + 1, j + 1) and δ n (i, j + 1) = (i, j + 2), we obtain that the second term is nonnegative by (repeated) application of (8). If δ n (i + 1, j) = (i + 1, j + 1), we come to the same conclusion. By (7),
and thus by (9),
Finally, to prove (10) for n + 1,
The first term is nonnegative by (10) . If δ n+1 (i, j) = (i+1, j), then for both δ n (i, j) = (i+1, j) and δ n (i, j) = (i, j + 1), it follows that the second term is nonnegative by application of (8) for n + 1 and (10). If δ n+1 (i, j) = (i, j + 1), then also δ n (i, j) = (i, j + 1) by (7), and thus the second term is nonnegative by (10) .
The following theorem states that this recursive procedure generates an individually optimal decision function f * .
where f * is defined as
Proof. By virtue of (9)- (10), the sequence τ n (i, j) is non-decreasing in n and bounded. Hence the limits of τ n (i, j) and δ n (i, j) exist and satisfy for all i ≥ 1, j ≥ 0,
where
where P is the (transient) transition probability matrix with
Iterating (11) yields v = P n v. Since transitions are restricted to neighboring states, P n (i,j),(k,l) = 0 for all (k, l) with k > i + n. Hence, since τ (i, j) and τ f * (i, j) are bounded by i/(µ − λ),
where 1 is the all-one vector. (P n 1) (i,j) is the probability that the Markov chain P does not reach the absorbing boundary i = 0 in n transitions, when starting in (i, j). This probability is bounded by P (X i > n), where X i is the number of transitions to reach 0 of the random walk on the non-negative integers with one-step probabilities P j,j−1 = 1−P j,j+1 = µ λ+µ , when it starts in state i. This random walk reflects that all future arrivals are sent to the busy queue. By Markov's inequality, P (X i > n) ≤ E(X 2 i )/n 2 . Hence, from (12),
Letting n → ∞, we conclude that v(i, j) = 0, which completes the proof.
Next we describe the main structural properties of the policy f * .
The above theorem says that if the busy queue is no longer than the idle queue, then the individually optimal decision for any customer is to join the busy queue. The theorem below states monotonicity of the individually optimal policy in j.
Proof. Suppose f * (i, j) = B for some i ≥ 1, j ≥ 0. This implies
where the last inequality follows from (7) by taking n → ∞. Hence, f * (i, j + 1) = B.
To prove monotonicity in i, we first need a technical result.
Proof. Fix j ≥ 0. First, we show by induction that for all 1 ≤ k ≤ i − 1,
For k = 1,
where the inequality follows from the bound τ (2, j) ≤ 2/(µ − λ). Now we assume that (13) holds for k ≤ i − 2 and then show that it also holds for k + 1.
which concludes the proof of (13) . Next, to establish concavity, we have for
where the inequality follows by repeated application of (13).
With the above result we can prove monotonicity in i.
Proof. Fix i ≥ 2. By downward induction we will prove for j ≥ 0 that f * (i, j) = B implies f * (k, j) = B for all 1 ≤ k ≤ i. By Theorem 5.3 this is true for j ≥ i. Now we assume that it holds for j and then show that it also holds for j − 1. Suppose f * (i, j − 1) = B. If j > 1, then f * (1, j − 1) = B by Theorem 5.3. To show that this is also valid for j = 1, first note that f * (i, 0) = B implies ci µ < dτ (i, 1), and thus, by using
Hence,
and thus for 1 ≤ k ≤ i,
where the second inequality follows from Theorem 5.5. Hence f * (k, j − 1) = B.
Theorems 5.4 and 5.6 imply that the individually optimal policy is described by a switching curve h(·) such that it is optimal for a customer to join the busy queue in state (i, j) is j > h(i), and that h is a non-decreasing function of i. Note that h depends on the costs c and d. This completes the discussion of the individually optimal policy.
Socially Optimal Policy
Finally, suppose there is a central controller who can route the customers so as to minimize the long run expected waiting cost per unit time. Let Z(t) be the total number of customers in the system (those in the busy queue plus those in the idle queue) at time t. We begin with an easy but important observation.
Lemma 5.7. {Z(t), t ≥ 0} is the queue length process in an M/M/1 queue regardless of the routing policy followed.
Proof. The total arrival process to the system is a Poisson process with rate λ, the service times are independent and exponential with rate µ, and the polling service discipline is work conserving. Hence the lemma follows. Now let X(t) be the number of customers in the busy queue and Y (t) be the number in the idle queue at time t. Then the total cost C(t) over (0, t] is given by
The process {C(t), t ≥ 0} does depend on the routing policy. Let T n be the nth time when the system busy cycle ends, i.e., when Z(t) reaches 0. Let
be the total cost incurred over the interval (T n , T n+1 ]. An important implication of the above lemma is that {C(t), t ≥ 0} is a (delayed in case Z(0) > 0) renewal reward process, since {(C n , T n+1 − T n ), n ≥ 1} is a sequence of independent and identically distributed bi-variate random variables. Furthermore, {T n+1 − T n , n ≥ 1} is a sequence of independent busy cycles in an M/M/1 queue. Hence, their common distribution does not depend on the routing policy, and
Then, from the results on renewal reward processes, we obtain that
Also, we have the following bound:
Thus the long run average cost exists and is finite, and it is proportional to the total cost in first busy cycle started with one customer in the system. Thus the problem of finding an average cost optimal policy reduces to the problem of finding an optimal policy that minimizes the total expected cost C over a busy period T starting in state (1, 0) . This can be written as
Clearly the first term is independent of the routing policy followed. Thus, to minimize C, we need to minimize the integral X(t)dt if c > d and maximize it if c < d. If c = d, any policy is optimal. Clearly, when c ≤ d, it is optimal to send all traffic to the busy queue. The interesting case arises when c > d. Hence we deal with that case below. The above discussion implies that, without loss of generality, we can assume c = 1, and d = 0. Note that this is in stark contrast with the individually optimal policies that depend on both c and d. We can now formulate the cost minimization as a standard negative dynamic programming problem, see e.g. Ross [15] . Below we make the details precise.
Let v(i, j) be the minimum expected total cost starting in state (X(0), Y (0)) = (i, j) over the time interval [0, T ) where
Without loss of generality we can assume that λ + µ = 1. From Ross [15] it follows that v satisfies the optimality equations:
where v(0, 0) = 0. We are interested in the solution to the above equations, which can be obtained by the following value iteration for n ≥ 0:
with initially v 0 (i, j) = 0 for all i ≥ 1, j ≥ 0 and v n (0, 0) = 0 for all n ≥ 0.
Note that the v n in the above iteration is guaranteed to converge to v as n → ∞, even though the costs are unbounded. Once v is computed, the theory of negative dynamic programming says that the optimal policy in state (i, j) is to route an incoming customer to the busy queue if v(i + 1, j) < v(i, j + 1), and to the idle queue otherwise.
Unfortunately, we have been unable to formally derive any structural results for socially optimal policy, the main stumbling block being the term v n (j, 0) on the right hand side of the equation for v n+1 (1, j). However, based on extensive numerical experimentation we have seen that a switching curve policy is optimal. That is, for each i ≥ 1, there is a critical number g(i) such that the optimal policy in state (i, j) is to route the incoming customer to the busy queue if j > g(i) and to the idle queue otherwise. Furthermore, in a fairly large parameter space, the switching curve can be approximated by the linear function:
where α = 2ρ
It is easy to see that α > 1. We have also observed numerically that h(i) ≤ g(i) for all i ≥ 1, where h is the switching curve for the individually optimal policy. That is, more customers join the busy queue under the individually optimal policy than under the socially optimal policy. We shall illustrate these comments with a numerical example in Section 7.
In the next section we shall develop a fluid model of this scenario and derive an optimal routing policy.
Fluid Model
Consider a fluid equivalent of the polling system described in Section 2. Customers arrive as a fluid with deterministic rate λ per unit time and can be routed to the busy queue or the idle queue. The cost structure remains the same. Once the server empties a queue, he switches to the other queue and continues to empty it. The fluid is removed at a deterministic rate µ > λ as long as there is fluid to be removed. Once the system becomes empty, the fluid is removed at rate λ, and the system stays empty forever. As before, the queue that is being served is called the busy queue, and the other one is called the idle queue.
Let x(t) be the amount of fluid in the busy queue, and y(t) the amount of fluid in the idle queue, at time t. Suppose the initial state is x(0) = x 0 ≥ 0 and y(0) = y 0 ≥ 0. Let z(t) = x(t) + y(t) be the total fluid in the system at time t. Then z(0) = x(0) + y(0) and regardless of the routing policy followed, z(t) decreases at rate λ − µ < 0, until it hits zero at time
and then z(t) remains 0 for t ≥ T . As in the previous section, the total cost incurred can be written as
We want to determine the optimal routing policy for the incoming fluid so as to minimize this cost. Since the routing policy does not affect the trajectory of z, the optimal policy needs to minimize the second integral if c > d, and maximize it if c < d. The optimal routing policy for t ≥ T is obvious: keep sending the incoming fluid to the busy queue, and both the queues will remain empty forever. Thus we concentrate on the optimal policy for 0 ≤ t ≤ T . If c < d, the optimal policy is to route all traffic to the busy queue. If c = d all routing policies are optimal. Hence we further concentrate on the case c > d in the rest of this section.
We assume the server has just switched to queue 1 at time zero and the system is nonempty. Thus x 0 > 0 and y 0 = 0, and queue 1 is the busy queue at time zero. Since the system is entirely deterministic, the routing policy is completely described by the instantaneous rate at which the incoming fluid is routed to the two queues as a function of time. Let r(t) be the rate at which fluid is routed to the idle queue at time t, t ≥ 0. Then λ − r(t) is the rate at which fluid is routed to the busy queue. Now let t(0) = 0 and t k be the time at which the server switches from one queue to the other, called the kth switching time. These times are completely determined by the function {r(t), t ≥ 0} as follows:
Thus queue 2 becomes the busy queue at time t 1 and now has
amount of fluid in it. Queue 1 becomes the idle queue and has no fluid in it. Thus we can recursively obtain, for k ≥ 1:
We call [t k , t k+1 ) the kth cycle. Note that x k+1 also represents the total amount of fluid routed to the idle queue during the kth cycle. The next theorem gives an important preliminary result on the optimal policy.
Theorem 6.1. Let {r(t), t ≥ 0} be a given routing policy where r(t) is the instantaneous rate at which incoming fluid is routed to the idle queue at time t. Let {t k , k ≥ 0} and {x k , k ≥ 0} be as given in (16) and (17) . Let
and define a new routing policy {s(t), t ≥ 0} as follows:
Then the total cost incurred by routing policy {s(t), t ≥ 0} is no greater than that of {r(t), t ≥ 0}.
Proof. Let x(t) and y(t) be the fluid levels at time t under the routing policy {r(t), t ≥ 0}, and x s (t) and y s (t) be the fluid levels at time t under the routing policy {s(t), t ≥ 0}. First note that the amount of fluid routed to the idle queue under the {s(t), t ≥ 0} policy during the kth cycle is λv k = x k+1 , which is the same as under the {r(t), t ≥ 0} policy. However, this fluid is routed at the fastest rate possible, namely λ. Hence
Since x(t) + y(t) = x s (t) + y s (t) for all t (since the total fluid content is independent of the routing policy), it follows that
In fact, we have
Thus x s (t) > 0 for t k ≤ t < t k+1 , and {x s (t), t ≥ t k } reaches zero for the first time at time t k+1 . Thus the switching times under routing policy s are the same as under policy r, and x s k = x k for all k ≥ 0. Thus we have
Thus the cost under s is no greater than that under r over the first cycle. Since the state of the polling system under both policies is the same at time t 1 , the above argument can be repeated to show that policy s performs at least as well as policy r over every cycle, and hence for all 0 ≤ t ≤ T .
The above theorem implies that a policy is equally well characterized by the switching times {t k , k ≥ 0} it induces (with t 0 = 0), and among all the policies with these switching times, a policy that sends all the traffic to the idle queue first as long as possible in each cycle, is optimal. Thus all that remains to be done is to identify the optimal switching times.
Since the system is deterministic, determining optimal {t k , k ≥ 0} is equivalent to determining the optimal fluid levels {x k , k ≥ 1}, with a given initial level x 0 . The next theorem shows that this can be modeled and solved as a Linear Quadratic Regulator (LQR) problem, see Bryson and Ho [8] , and Bertsekas [2] . Theorem 6.2. The optimal {x k , k ≥ 1} are obtained by solving the following infinite horizon constrained LQR:
subject to
Proof. Let {t k , k ≥ 0} be the switching times of the optimal policy. From Theorem 6.1 we see that there exist {v k , k ≥ 0} such that over the kth cycle [t k , t k+1 ) it is optimal to route all fluid to the idle queue over [t k , t k + v k ) and then route all fluid to the busy queue over
Thus, during the interval [t k , t k + v k ), the fluid level in the busy queue decreases at rate µ from x k to x k − µv k , after which it decreases at rate µ − λ from x k − µv k to 0. For the idle queue, the fluid level increases at rate λ from 0 to λv k over [t k , t k + v k ), and then stays constant over [t k + v k , t k+1 ). A little algebra shows that
Therefore, the cost during the kth cycle is:
Furthermore, we obtain the following dynamics:
Note that using the dynamics we have
So subtracting
times the left hand side of (20) (which is like subtracting a constant) from the sum of (19) over all k, we need to solve the following problem:
To eliminate the product λx k v k we define the new variable
which allows us to rewrite our problem as (18) .
The next theorem presents the solution to the above problem.
Theorem 6.3. The optimal solution to the constrained LQR in Theorem 6.2 is given by
and
where β = 2ρ
Proof. Without constraint (18c) problem (18) is the standard (infinite-horizon discrete-time) LQR problem. Initially we ignore constraint (18c). Then the solution to the optimal control problem (18) is given by
and p is the (unique) nonnegative solution of the discrete time algebraic Ricatti equation:
That is, the optimal solution is given by
which can written as 21. Recall that we ignored constraint (18c). However, solution (21) satisfies (18c), so (21) is also the optimal solution for problem (18) including constraint (18c). Using 21 in x k+1 = λv k and u k = x k − µv k we get (22) .
One can show that 0 ≤ β < 1. Thus the amount of the fluid at switch-over times decreases geometrically to zero. The optimal policy goes through an infinite number of switch-overs before the system becomes empty. The next theorem specifies the optimal policy implied by the above theorem. Theorem 6.4. Let α be as in (15) . It is optimal to route all incoming fluid to the idle queue at time t if y(t) < αx(t) (24) and all incoming fluid to the busy queue otherwise.
Proof. Notice that at time v k , the fluid level of the busy queue reduces to
and that of the idle queue increases from 0 to
Thus (24) is satisfied for t ∈ [t k + v k , t k+1 ), and it is not satisfied for t ∈ [t k , t k + v k ). At t = t k + v k it is satisfied at equality. This proves the theorem.
Note that the switching curve in (24) matches the conjecture in (14)! Remark 6.5. In the derivations of the previous three theorems, we have assumed that y(0) = 0, but this is not a restriction. To see this consider two cases: i. 0 < y(0) = y 0 ≤ αx 0 : Consider a system starting at time τ = −y(0)/λ, in state x(τ ) = x 0 + µτ and y(τ ) = 0. Then following the optimal policy of Theorem 6.4 from time t ≥ τ will bring the system to state x(0) = x 0 and y(0) = y 0 . Hence the same optimal policy will continue to hold for t ≥ 0 from the principle of optimality.
ii. 0 < αx 0 < y(0) = y 0 : In this case define
Now consider a system starting at time τ = −(τ 1 + τ 2 ), in state x(τ ) = x 0 + α(µ − λ)τ 1 + µτ 2 and y(τ ) = 0. Then following the optimal policy of Theorem 6.4 from time t ≥ τ will bring the system to state x(0) = x 0 and y(0) = y 0 . Hence the same optimal policy will continue to hold for t ≥ 0 from the principle of optimality.
Numerical Example and Conclusions
In this section we present a numerical example with the following parameters: λ = 0.3, µ = 0.7, c = 6, d = 1.
The three switching curves for the three policies are shown in Figure 2 . The bottom curve corresponds to the switching curve h of the individually optimal policy. It is optimal to join the busy queue in all states (i, j) that lie above this curve. We have numerically observed that as d approaches zero, the switching curve moves up and it reaches h(i) = i when d = 0, that is, the individually optimal policy is to join the shortest queue when d = 0. On the other hand, as d increases, the switching curve moves down, and reaches h(i) = 0 when d ≥ c: that is, the optimal policy is to always join the busy queue. The top curve in Figure 2 corresponds to the switching curve g of the socially optimal policy. As we discussed before, this is independent of c and d, as long as c > d. The middle curve corresponds to the fluid switching curve αi, where α is as in (15) . The fluid curve is also independent of c and d as long as c > d. It is interesting to see that the two curves are quite close. For both policies, it is optimal to join the busy queue in all states (i, j) that lie above the curve.
Observe that both the socially optimal and the fluid switching curves are above the curve j = i, while the individually optimal curve is below it. This observation for the individually optimal policies was proved in Theorem 5.3. It follows for the fluid policy, because we know that α > 1. We have not been able to prove it for the socially optimal policy. Figure 2 also shows that more customers join the busy queue under the individually optimal policy than under the socially optimal policy. This is consistent with the general observation in other queueing systems, and it is a result of externalities: in individually optimal policies, customers are selfish and ignore the cost their decision imposes on other customers, and hence tend to over-utilize the resources.
It would be interesting to formally prove these observations, but we leave that as future work. In the current paper we considered a simple exhaustive polling system with two queues, identical exponential service times, and no switch-over times and switch-over costs. Clearly, several extensions are possible: to more than two queues, non-identical exponential service times, general service times, service policies other than exhaustive service, non-zero switch-over times or costs, and so on. Each of these extensions makes the analysis harder, since the expressions for the expected queue lengths become more involved.
